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In this article, we seek to advance the theoretic and empirical literature
on the diversionary use of force. We argue that state leaders are more
likely to engage in diversionary foreign policy behavior when opposition
groups from within the winning coalition press for policy changes, but
the government rejects those policy demands. Only when domestic
unrest threatens a loss of political support from groups that are politi-
cally important to the leadership do we expect leaders to try and rally
their support through heightened international conflict. We test this
argument in an analysis of Japanese foreign policy behavior from 1890
to 1941 regarding (i) the initiation of military threats, (ii) concessions
in negotiations, and (iii) the escalation of military confrontations. Draw-
ing upon new data sets collected on Japanese domestic politics and for-
eign relations, we find strong support for our argument in a series of
statistical tests.
There is an extensive scholarly literature on the relationship between domestic
and international conflict. In this paper, we focus on the ‘‘diversionary use of
force’’ literature in which the central question is whether political leaders experi-
encing internal political turmoil are more likely to engage in confrontational for-
eign policy behavior. A common claim is that during such periods of domestic
unrest, government leaders attempt to divert public and elite attention away
from internal problems by initiating and escalating international conflicts. The
argument is that leaders anticipate rallying domestic support in opposition to an
external threat, which should weaken prevailing domestic political discontent
1 Authors’ notes: We thank the ISQ editors, the anonymous reviewers, and members of the CIDCM Workshop on
Peace and Conflict for their helpful comments. Replication materials are available at Paul Huth’s Dataverse
(http://dvn.iq.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/phuth) and the ISQ Dataverse (http://dvn.iq.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/isq).
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and help to restore their position of political leadership. This argument, how-
ever, has not been well supported by empirical tests in the quantitative literature.
We argue that theoretic and research design problems help to explain why the
diversionary literature has not generated more supportive findings. In this paper,
we therefore seek to advance the diversionary literature both theoretically and
empirically by addressing what we consider to be shortcomings in the existing lit-
erature. In so doing, our empirical tests of a reformulated diversionary theory
produce strong and consistent empirical results.
Our theoretic contribution is to identify the more specific conditions under
which domestic political unrest leads to foreign conflict. Our re-formulation of
diversionary theory leads us to the conclusion that the relationship between
domestic political unrest and confrontational foreign policy behavior is more
complex and contingent than is often recognized in the existing literature. Spe-
cifically, we argue that the diversionary use of force depends crucially upon the
political salience of opposition groups and the response of the government to
opposition demands. When governments fail to accommodate the policy
demands of opposition groups that form part of the regime’s winning coalition,
leaders have strong diversionary incentives to engage in international conflict. In
contrast, if the government accommodates opposition demands, or adopts a
hard-line position against groups that are not within its winning coalition, then
we argue there is no reason to expect leaders to engage in diversionary foreign
policy behavior.
Empirically, our contributions center on the use of an alternative research
design in which tests of diversionary behavior are situated in the context of a
state’s ongoing foreign policy relationships with countries that are of central con-
cern to its security policy. Furthermore, we move away from commonly employed
country-year research designs and instead break down each year within Japan
into varying periods of domestic unrest and no unrest. As a result, we are able to
more precisely test for the relationship between domestic unrest and diversionary
foreign policy behavior across different stages in the development of interna-
tional disputes as well as among multiple potential targets of such actions. Thus,
rather than treating the use of force as the sole dependent variable (DV), we
consider different policy choices that confront leaders over the course of an
international dispute.2 Three DVs are therefore analyzed: (i) the initiation of
confrontational military policies to challenge the status quo, (ii) the decisions to
offer ⁄withhold concessions during periods of negotiations in rounds of talks,
and (iii) the military confrontation stage in which escalation ⁄de-escalation of
threats occur. At each stage, we argue that diversionary incentives can influence
foreign policy decisions, and we find strong empirical support for our theoretic
arguments.
We test our argument on an original data set that contains detailed informa-
tion on Japanese domestic politics and international relations with four principal
countries (China, Russia, Great Britain, and the United States) from the period
beginning in 1890, the year of the first Imperial Diet of Japan, and ending in
1941 with the outbreak of the Word War II in the Pacific.3 Japan presents a good
case for our analyses as the country experienced considerable political change
and instability that challenged the power and authority of incumbent regimes.
At the same time, Japanese foreign policy was characterized by considerable
2 See Huth and Allee (2002) for a general analysis of different stages in the study of international disputes and
conflicts.
3 The Imperial Diet, Japan’s modern legislature, was established by the Meiji Constitution in February 1889 and
the Diet first met in November 1890. The Diet consisted of a House of Representatives and a House of Peers. The
House of Representatives was directly elected, though based on a limited franchise, while the House of Peers con-
sisted of high ranking nobles (Hunter 1984).
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variation in diplomatic and military relations with these four countries which
were at the center of Japanese national security policy.4
The remainder of the paper unfolds as follows. First, we review the existing lit-
erature on diversionary theory with a focus on a few key theoretic and empirical
issues. Second, we present our theoretic framework and derive testable hypothe-
ses. Third, we present our research design for statistical analyses and discuss how
the dependent and independent variables are measured. Fourth, we report the
results of statistical analyses. Fifth, we present a case study of the outbreak of the
Sino-Japanese War in 1894 to illustrate the relationship between diversionary
incentives and confrontational Japanese foreign policy behavior as suggested by
the statistical findings. Finally, we conclude with a discussion of the implications
of our findings for diversionary theory and directions for future research.
Review of Literature
In response to the problems with the early literature, over the past two decades,
research on diversionary theory has been directed toward improving the theo-
retic foundations of arguments as well as developing better research designs to
test more sophisticated hypotheses.5 The research focus has shifted from the
question of whether domestic unrest provides leaders with an incentive to
engage in diversionary conflict to whether the ‘‘willingness’’ to divert attention
externally is constrained by the ‘‘opportunity’’ to do so. As such, researchers
have attempted to develop hypotheses explaining when the environment (both
domestic and international) is conducive to diversionary behavior.6
With respect to the opportunity to engage in diversionary theory, Meernik and
Waterman (1996) argue that states face varying international threat environ-
ments and therefore the likelihood of diversionary actions is conditioned by the
international threat opportunities that state leaders face during periods of
domestic unrest.7 Other scholars have also considered the international context
and its consequences for state leaders to engage in diversionary foreign policy
actions. Smith (1996), for example, argues that potential targets of diversionary
actions can act strategically to try and reduce the likelihood that they in fact
become the targets of military threats and uses of force. By avoiding hard-line
policies and even initiating more cooperative policies, they can seek to under-
mine justifications for confrontational policies by leaders motivated by diversion-
ary incentives.8
Scholars have also looked at the willingness of executives to engage in diver-
sionary behavior by analyzing the relationship between policy substitutability at
the domestic level and international conflict. For example, Meernik and Water-
man (1996) and Bennett and Nordstrom (2000) argue that it is important to
look for occasions where state leaders refrained from taking military action, or
stopped military operations in order to appease domestic discontent.9
Consequently, Bennett and Nordstrom argue that substitutability should be
4 The logic of selecting these four states as Japan’s potential diversionary foreign targets is discussed in the
following paragraphs.
5 In his widely cited review, Jack Levy (1989) concludes that the early diversionary literature suffered from
flawed theories and research designs.
6 See, for example, Morgan and Bickers (1992), Meernik and Waterman (1996), Smith (1996), Gelpi (1997),
Leeds and Davis (1997), Meernik (2000), Chiozza and Goemans (2003, 2004), Mitchell and Prins (2004), DeRouen
and Goldfinch (2005), Tarar (2006), Kisangani and Pickering (2007), Sobek (2007), Brule´ (2008b), Foster (2008).
7 They further contend that the international threat environment is a more powerful explanation of a states’
involvement in international conflicts than domestic unrest.
8 Leeds and Davis (1997), Clark (2003), Chiozza and Goemans (2004), Tarar (2006), and Foster (2008) also
argue that strategic interaction may play a role in determining whether leaders act on their diversionary incentives.
9 Other studies that consider decisions to not use force or take forceful action include DeRouen (2003),
Sathasivam (2003), Tarar (2006), and Brule´ (2008a).
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investigated through better specification of models and the use of multinomial
logit analysis techniques.
Gelpi (1997) argues, moreover, that the policy substitutability is directly rele-
vant to the problem of how leaders respond to domestic unrest. In his analysis,
state leaders across any type of regime can choose among at least three strategies
when faced with domestic unrest: (i) accept the demands of the dissatisfied
groups, (ii) repress the dissatisfied groups by force, or (iii) divert the public’s
attention by using force internationally. Likewise, Huth and Lust-Okar (1998)
focus on the decision of state leaders to either repress or accommodate the
demands of political opposition, and on how that decision has implications for
whether states’ leaders pursue a more aggressive foreign policy.
Finally, Morgan and Bickers (1992) present a useful theoretic framework for
analyzing diversionary actions. Of critical importance is their argument that state
leaders view an erosion of domestic support more seriously when it comes from
within segments of society that form part of the leader’s base of political support
than when it comes from other domestic groups. In their analysis, they find that
the diversionary uses of force is more likely when US presidents face low
approval ratings among their own party members.10
To conclude our review of the literature, we summarize three insights that we
incorporate into our work based on prior research. First, we agree with Morgan
and Bickers (1992) on the theoretic importance of relating diversionary incentives
to the concept of coalition support, i.e., the erosion of domestic political support
from within a government’s winning coalition increases diversionary incentives.
Second, we incorporate the idea of domestic and foreign policy substitutability into
our theoretic framework. Third, we believe the likelihood of diversionary foreign
policy behavior is related to the international opportunities state leaders have to
confront other countries with confrontational policies. As a result, our research
design and models for empirical testing seek to take into account the varying
disputes and threats faced by Japanese leaders internationally.
Theoretic Reformulation
We put forward a general argument which generates hypotheses that explain
what diplomatic and military policies are likely to be chosen by state leaders
under varying conditions of domestic political unrest. We first describe the stages
that are associated with the development of international disputes, as our
hypotheses capture foreign policy alternatives that change over the course of an
international dispute. We then develop the argument and related hypotheses
that explain what choices foreign policy leaders are likely to make regarding the
use of diplomacy and ⁄or military force.
International Disputes and Foreign Policy Choices
International disputes arise when a state is dissatisfied with the status quo in
issue areas involving other states. If a state finds itself dissatisfied with the
current status quo, a state may attempt to challenge the prevailing status quo by
taking diplomatic and ⁄or military measures against a rival state. If a challenger
state initiates a call for negotiations, the challenger state and a target state may
then enter into talks. Instead of diplomatic measures, a challenger state could
also initiate coercive military measures to try and change the status quo with a
foreign opponent. Once a challenger threatens military force and a target state
reciprocates, the two states then find themselves engaged in a military confronta-
tion. In this study, then, we consider three stages of international disputes: (i)
10 Foster and Palmer (2006), however, were unable to confirm these results using updated data.
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the initiation of confrontational military policies to challenge the status quo ver-
sus seeking negotiations or taking no actions, (ii) the outcome of negotiations
over disputed issues once talks have been pursued by both parties, and (iii) the
possible escalation of military confrontations to the outbreak of war.
This framework is applied to analyzing Japan’s foreign relations with four
specific states, China, Russia, Great Britain, and the United States, from 1890–
1941. We selected these countries because during this time period foreign
relations with these countries largely determined the international threat envi-
ronment within which Japanese policy makers operated. Because we believe
that a leader’s incentives to engage in diversionary actions are constrained by
international target opportunities, it is important to focus our analysis on
those countries that have important and ongoing foreign policy interactions
with Japan.11
Also, our specific focus on Japan’s international relations with these four states
makes sense in terms of the logic underlying the diversionary theory. For politi-
cally insecure Japanese leaders to effectively induce ‘‘in-group’’ unity and cohe-
sion and therefore rally domestic support behind the leadership, an ‘‘outside’’
target must be widely perceived among the Japanese populace as a foreign adver-
sary. Drawing on the secondary historical literature (for example, Mayo 1970;
Nish 1977, 1985, 1990; Myers and Peattie 1984), we argue that within Japan there
were generally shared perceptions among elites and attentive publics that rela-
tions with China, Russia, Great Britain, and the United States remained consis-
tently salient with respect to issues and disputes relating to (i) bilateral trade
and foreign economic policies, (ii) territorial disputes, (iii) arms control and
competition over naval forces, and (iv) competition over political and economic
interests within China and Korea.12
Building a Theory of Diversionary Foreign Policy Choices
We begin by discussing the concept of domestic political unrest. Generally, schol-
ars use domestic unrest as an inclusive term for different types of internal political
opposition to governments, including anti-government protests, demonstrations
and riots, political terrorism and assassinations, rebellions, and radical move-
ments.13 We define domestic political unrest as various types of opposition chal-
lenges targeted at the incumbent government and its policies. Although the type
of political challenge against the leadership could vary from labor protests to
student demonstrations to an attempted coup by the military, in each case differ-
ent opposition groups—labor, students, and the military—present demands and
pressure the leadership for policy changes.
It is important to also consider the political saliency of opposition groups dur-
ing periods of domestic unrest. We argue that not all types of political opposi-
tion threaten an incumbent’s leadership, but rather only political challenges
coming from certain opposition groups threaten an incumbent leader’s reten-
tion of power. We further argue that some political challenges originate from
groups that provide more critical support for incumbent leaders to stay in offi-
ce—that is, a coalition of groups that the incumbent regime relies on for hold-
ing power. Political leaders do not need to assure continued support from all
groups, but can attain and retain power by bringing together a coalition of
groups that are strong enough to defeat other challenges to the government.
11 See Sprecher and DeRouen (2002) and DeRouen and Sprecher (2006) for related work in the diversionary
theory literature that utilizes a dyadic-based analysis.
12 We draw upon the classic argument in social psychology that conflict behavior with out-groups can serve to
foster social cohesion among in-groups (for example, Simmel 1955; Coser 1956).
13 Banks (1994) uses eight categories: assassinations, general strikes, guerrilla warfare, government crises,
purges, riots, revolutions, and anti-government demonstrations.
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While the size and composition of key support groups for incumbents differ
across types of political regimes, all must rely on the support of a winning coali-
tion in some form to maintain power (for example, Bueno de Mesquita, Smith,
Siverson, and Morrow 2003).
Given that an incumbent’s leadership hinges upon maintaining a coalition,
we expect that the incumbent is most concerned about losing coalitional sup-
port by rejecting demands from certain groups within that winning coalition. In
general, government leaders have alternatives in responding to domestic politi-
cal challenges—i.e., to reject or accept opposition demands. Regardless of which
political groups are confronting the leadership, when the government accedes
to the policy demands of the opposition, the immediate political crisis is
expected to subside and therefore diversionary incentives for leaders should be
weak. On the other hand, if the government rejects the opposition’s policy
claims, then leaders continue to face domestic political opposition and discon-
tent. While it is less threatening for the leadership to reject demands that come
from politically marginal groups, it is more difficult but sometimes necessary to
reject demands of certain groups within the winning coalition. The reason for
this is that winning coalitions are typically comprised of multiple groups who do
not necessarily share the same policy preferences across diverse domestic and
foreign policy issue areas. As a result, in fashioning a winning coalition, the
leadership often times has to balance competing or varying interests among his
coalition supporters. The leadership then must make hard choices over compet-
ing policy demands, given resource and other constraints. This means that, at
times, the leadership is forced to be selective in choosing what policies to imple-
ment, which results in the rejection of policy demands from certain coalition
partners.
One example of domestic unrest that we develop in greater detail in our case
study concerns the political disputes between Prime Minister Ito and two of his
coalition partners, the Jiyuto (Liberal Party) and Kokumin Kyokai (political
group) in 1894. Both Kokumin Kyokai and the Jiyuto were part of the winning
coalition14 mainly because the Ito cabinet needed to rely on the Kokumin Kyokai
for armament expansion and industrialization, whereas the support of Jiyuto on
the issue of foreign treaty revisions was valuable (Mutsu 1982). By May 1894,
however, cooperation between these political allies collapsed to the point where
the Jiyuto demanded budgetary and land tax reform, while Kokumin Kyokai
challenged the cabinet over revising unequal treaties with Western powers.
Despite the demands emanating from these two groups inside his larger coali-
tion, the Prime Minister rejected their demands and instead continued to imple-
ment his preferred domestic and foreign policies with the support of the other
coalition members (Banno 1992).
If an incumbent leader fails to accept demands from selective groups within
its winning coalition, the incumbent is threatened with the loss of political sup-
port that is important to the retention of power. It is in this situation where lead-
ership faces declining support from some of its political allies, where we expect
the use of diversionary foreign policies. We believe it theoretically crucial, then,
to understand where political opposition is coming from. By distinguishing
between unrest emanating from groups within or outside the winning coalition,
we can identify those particular domestic political conditions under which a state
leader is motivated to adopt hostile policies abroad in pursuit of domestic rally
effects.15
14 The larger winning coalition included the Genro (elder statesmen), oligarchic elites from specific clans, the
military leadership of the Navy and Army, and two smaller parties: Chuo Club and Kinki Kokutai.
15 See MacKuen (1983) and Fordham (1998), however, for arguments about why groups from outside the win-
ning coalition may also have an effect on diversionary behavior.
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In Table 1, we summarize our argument by considering four different situa-
tions of domestic political unrest. The four different situations reflect which
domestic political groups make demands and how the government responds to
those demands. We argue that when incumbent leaders reject coalition member
demands (cell 3), the probability of diversionary foreign policy actions is great-
est, whereas in all of the remaining cases of domestic unrest (cells 1, 2, and 4),
we argue that governments are unlikely to engage in diversionary foreign policy
actions. We state our first hypothesis formally as:
Hypothesis 1: When domestic unrest is marked by government leaders rejecting demands
from groups within the winning coalition, leaders are:
(a) more likely to initiate military threats compared to either diplomatic initiatives or to
refrain from actions to challenge the foreign policy status quo with a rival state
(b) less likely to make concessions in negotiations with a rival state, and
(c) more likely to escalate ongoing military confrontations with a rival state.
In the challenge the status quo stage (H1a), we posit that political leaders with
diversionary incentives will initiate military threats over a disputed issue, but will
not pursue diplomatic initiatives for the same domestic reason. While one could
argue that a call for negotiations can be advanced in a hostile manner (for
example, the target of the proposal is blamed for the dispute, the initiator seeks
to legitimize its unyielding position, and demands are made on the target to
make key policy concessions), we think that such diplomatic initiatives are likely
to be less effective than military threats in generating domestic rallying effects as
a call for negotiations is often viewed as a less confrontational policy designed to
resolve disputes.16 We argue that government leaders will generally not find dip-
lomatic policy initiatives useful for diversionary purposes, and therefore, in a
pair-wise comparison between threatening military force and initiating a call for
negotiations, the initiation of military threats will be preferred over pursuing a
call for negotiations largely because the former is more likely to produce diver-
sionary benefits compared to the latter.
In H1b, we consider how domestic political unrest influences the adoption by
state leaders of intransigent policies during negotiations. We argue that leaders
with diversionary incentives are more likely to adopt uncompromising behavior
when they are engaged in negotiations during rounds of talks. We expect that
these leaders are likely to hold firm and make few concessions in negotiations
with a foreign adversary, because in this way leaders are able to demonstrate to
their domestic political allies their resolve in defending national interests. In
contrast, we believe that concessions on important issues in international dis-
putes run the risk of generating only further controversy and discontent among
those coalition groups who are challenging the government on other policy
issues. We argue that a safer political strategy at a time of political weakness is to
TABLE 1. Diversionary Incentives Based on Government Responses to Domestic Opposition
Demands from groups inside
ruling coalition






Low probability of diversionary
foreign policy action
2






High probability of diversionary
foreign policy action
4
Low probability of diversionary
foreign policy action
16 Additionally, it can be difficult to draw a distinction between diplomatic initiatives for friendly vs. hostile talks
when coding data.
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adopt a firm line in negotiations and to lay the blame for any failure of negotia-
tions on the foreign adversary.
Finally, in H1c we consider the decision of whether to escalate a militarized
dispute. We argue that if state leaders are engaged in ongoing military confron-
tations with international rivals, they are more likely to resort to higher levels of
escalation when they have diversionary incentives. The reason is that state leaders
with diversionary incentives understand that military actions will generate stron-
ger rallying effects if they are associated with favorable foreign policy outcomes.
As a result, such leaders will be more motivated to achieve a favorable crisis out-
come either through escalating coercive threats, or by decisive military action in
an armed conflict.
While domestic political unrest is the focus of our theoretic and empirical
analyses, it is also important to consider controls that take into account the inter-
national security context in which foreign policy choices are made. First, we
expect that as Japan becomes stronger militarily relative to its rivals, it is more
likely to adopt confrontational policies across the three equations.17 Second,
when Japan has common security ties with its rival or is involved in a military dis-
pute with another rival, we believe that it is more likely to adopt cooperative poli-
cies across the three equations.18 Third, Japan is more likely to be cooperative
when the rival engages in more accommodative behavior toward it, whereas if
the rival relies on confrontational policies, Japan is more likely to do the same.19
Fourth, in the negotiations and escalation equations, we include a control for
whether Japan was the initiator of talks or the militarized dispute.20 If Japanese
leaders initiated talks, we believe that it is more likely to make concessions, and
if Japan initiated military threats, it is more likely to escalate the military con-
frontation.21
Finally, we include two variables that address potential time-related effects in
challenging the status quo equation. First, we include a control for the length of
domestic unrest ⁄no unrest periods. Second, following Beck, Katz, and Tucker
(1998) we control for the effects of time by including a counter for the time that
elapses between decisions to either pursue negotiations or initiate hostilities.
Research Design and Variable Measurement
We test our hypotheses by analyzing Japanese foreign policy toward four rival
states: China, Russia, the UK, and the United States for the period 1890–1941.
As already described, we examine Japanese foreign policy at three different
stages of ongoing disputes with these countries.
17 By confrontational, we mean that Japan is more likely to initiate military threats, less likely to make conces-
sions, and more likely to escalate.
18 By cooperative, we mean that Japan is less likely to initiate military threats, more likely to make concessions,
and less likely to escalate military confrontations.
19 As we discuss in the following paragraphs, the coding rules for the rival foreign policy variable differs across
the three equations.
20 We therefore attempt to take into account possible selection effects. We cannot run a Heckman selection
model on these two equations because either Japan or rival states could have been the party to initiate actions that
lead to the round of talks or the militarized disputes. To run a Heckman model would require us to restrict the
analysis in the negotiations equation to only those rounds of talks initiated by Japan (less than 50%, see Table 2),
or in the military escalation equation to those militarized disputes initiated by Japan (about 62%, see Table 3). As
our focus is on testing diversionary theory, we do not want to limit the analysis to Japan as the initiator because we
expect diversionary incentives to influence Japanese behavior regardless of whether it initiated talks or a militarized
dispute.
21 As economic stability may also be related to diversionary incentives, we also included an economic growth
variable in our three equations as a robustness check. Our results remained the same, and the effect of economic
growth was inconsistent across the equations.
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Selection of Cases
In the first equation, we test whether domestic political unrest influences Japa-
nese initiatives to challenge the foreign policy status quo with its four rival
states.22 We identified 98 ‘‘unrest’’ periods and 76 ‘‘no-unrest’’ periods within
Japan from 1890–1941.23 The 98 discrete periods of domestic unrest were identi-
fied from a number of Japanese sources and these and other sources on Japa-
nese domestic politics were used to identify whether groups making demands
were part of the government’s winning coalition (for example, Dai Nihon
Teikoku Gikaishi Kankokai 1926–1930; Masumi 1966; Scalapino 1967; Teikoku
Gikai 1975–1979; Kokushi Daijiten Henshu Iinkai 1979–1997; Shiratori 1981;
Inoue, Nagahara, Kodama, and Okubo 1984–1990). There were 76 different periods
when Japanese leaders encountered no policy disputes with domestic opposition
groups. The total number of observations for the first equation totals 696.24
In the second equation, Japanese negotiation behavior is the DV and we test
whether domestic political conditions in Japan influence decisions to offer con-
cessions. A round of talks is the unit of observation; during 1890–1941, Japan
was involved in 295 rounds of talks with China, Russia, the UK, or the United
States (see Table 2). A wide range of Japanese diplomatic histories and archival
sources were consulted in the process of developing this negotiation data set.25
In the last equation, we focus on Japanese escalation behavior in ongoing milita-
rized conflicts with the four rival states. We test whether conditions of domestic
unrest influence Japanese decisions to increase, decrease, or hold steady the num-
ber of Japanese troops deployed during the course of a military crisis that could
threaten war. The unit of observation, therefore, is a militarized dispute between
Japan and any one of its four rivals, China, Russia, the UK, and the United States,
from 1890–1941. Once again, Japanese primary and secondary sources were heavily
drawn upon in constructing this data set.26 As shown in Table 3, we identified 68
military conflicts between Japan and the four rival states between 1890 and 1941.
Measurement of Dependent Variables
For the first DV in Equation 1, we code three outcomes: (i) no action and there-
fore maintenance of the status quo; (ii) attempt to open diplomatic talks and
negotiations; and (iii) initiation of a threat or use of military force.
TABLE 2. Rounds of Talks between Japan and Rival States, 1890–1941
Total number of rounds of talks Initiated by Japan Initiated by rival
China–Japan 91 52 39
Russia–Japan 59 28 31
UK–Japan 71 28 43
United States–Japan 74 32 42
Total 295 139 156
22 We also checked to see whether there was a problem with reverse causality in our results. To do this, we
regressed (using logit) the onset of domestic unrest on Japanese MID involvement against rival states. We found no
support for the claim that current military hostilities causes an increase in the probability of domestic unrest
occurring.
23 As a sensitivity check, we also tested our analysis using a dyad-monthly data set. Our results across all three
DVs remained very consistent and are available as part of our replication data set.
24 We multiply 174 (the sum of 98 unrest and 76 no-unrest cases) by 4 (the number of Japan’s rival states).
25 The primary sources include archival documents from the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Gaimusho
(1936–1963, 1949–1951, 1964–1987, 1965–1966, 1988, 1996) and Gaimusho Chosabu (1998). The secondary sources
include Crowley (1966), Kajima (1970–1974), Okamoto (1970), Hosoya (1971), Morley (1974), Shinobu (1974),
Nish (1977), Kajima (1980), Ikei (1982), Kajima Heiwa Kenkyujo (1983–1985), Hunter (1984), Beasley (1987).
26 Ibid. In addition, we also utilized Takeuchi (1935), Iriye (1965, 1987), Mitani (1997), and Kato (2002).
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The second DV is the outcome of negotiations involving Japan and its four
rival states. A value of 1 is recorded if Japan offers concessions to a rival state,
and 0 if no concessions were made.
The final DV is Japanese policy in military confrontations. Conceptually, we
posit three main policy alternatives: (i) maintaining the existing number of
troops deployed at the onset of the military confrontation; (ii) escalating the
confrontation with the reinforcement of additional armed forces; or (iii) de-
escalating by reducing the number of armed forces. To measure these outcomes,
we use changes in the number of Japanese troops deployed in the course of
a military confrontation. We subtracted the number of troops engaged at the
outset (for example, a display of force or limited use of force) from the total
number engaged when either the confrontation ended short of war, or it esca-
lated to the outbreak of war. Once again, we drew heavily upon Japanese sources
for data on troop numbers deployed over the course of a military confronta-
tion.27 Positive values indicate that the Japanese government decided to escalate
the level of hostilities against a rival state. Likewise, negative numbers indicate a
decision to de-escalate the level of hostilities against the rival.
To code each of our response variables, we relied upon secondary historical
works as well as Japanese archival sources (see footnote 25).
Measurement of Explanatory Variables
We begin with the coding procedures for our key diversionary hypothesis and
then we turn to the control variables:
Domestic Political Unrest and Diversionary Incentives
To test H1, we need to first code two separate variables from which an interac-
tion term can be created. The first variable measures whether opposition groups
making demands on the government are inside or outside the winning coalition
that forms the base of political support for the government (a value of 1 if inside
the coalition and 0 otherwise). The second variable measures whether the gov-
ernment rejects or accommodates the demands of domestic opposition groups
(a value of 1 if demands are rejected and 0 otherwise). The interaction term,
which tests HI, is generated by multiplying these two individual variables.
Drawing upon a wide range of Japanese and English-language sources, we were
able to identify 98 cases of domestic unrest, as well as which groups challenged
the government and what was the policy response of the leadership to the oppo-
sition it faced (Dai Nihon Teikoku Gikaishi Kankokai 1926–1930; Scalapino
1967; Teikoku Gikai 1975–1979; Kokushi Daijiten Henshu Iinkai 1979–1997;
Inoue et al. 1984–1990; Shugiin and Sangiin 1990). These same sources were
relied upon to identify which groups formed the winning coalition for different
governments. Opposition groups such as political parities not constituting a part
TABLE 3. Military Conflicts between Japan and Rival States, 1890–1941
Total number of military conflicts Initiated by Japan Initiated by rival
China–Japan 36 24 12
Russia–Japan 23 12 11
UK–Japan 6 4 2
US–Japan 3 2 1
Total 68 42 26
27 In addition to the sources listed in footnote 24, we also utilized Takeuchi (1935), Fujiwara (1961), Iriye
(1965, 1987), Mitani (1997), and Kato (2002).
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of a coalition cabinet were consistently judged to be outside winning coalitions,
while opposition groups such as coalitional political parties, ministers within an
incumbent cabinet, and Army generals at ministerial posts within cabinets (par-
ticularly after the attempted coup in 1936) were coded as within the winning
coalition.
Relative Military Capabilities
This variable measures Japanese military strength against rival states and is cre-
ated by taking the average of three different ratios (military personnel, military
expenditure, and expenditures per soldier for both Japan and rival states), each
of which are adjusted by distance from each state to locations where military con-
flicts were most likely, given the particular disputes between Japan and each of
the rival states (Bueno de Mesquita 1981). We relied upon the Correlates of War
(COW) Project Data Set on National Material Capabilities, 1816–2001 (NMC
Dataset Version 3.02) to code this variable. Missing Chinese data—mostly for
1890–1920—was filled in by consulting the volumes of China Year Book (1912–
1919, 1922, 1924–1928) and a secondary source (Yang 1985). In the status quo
and negotiation equations, we logged this variable to control for its skewed
distribution. In the escalation equation, we created another control variable
concerning the relative military capabilities at the local level between Japan and
its rival states. This variable is measured by the number of troops (measured
in units of 10,000), stationed prior to the outbreak of military disputes in the
specific location where the disputes began.
Alliances
We construct a dummy variable to indicate the presence of security ties between
Japan and a given rival state. A value of 1 is coded if Japan and its foreign oppo-
nent have a formal military alliance (defense pact, an entente, nonaggression
pacts or consultation pacts). To identify such alliances, we relied upon COW For-
mal Interstate Alliance Data Set, 1816–2000 (Alliance Dataset Version 3.03, 2003)
and the Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions (ATOP) dataset (Leeds,
Ritter, Mitchell, and Long 2002; Leeds 2005).
Issues at Stake
A value of 1 is recorded if the subject of negotiations concerned disputed territo-
ries between Japan and rival states, and 0 otherwise. Japanese sources describe-
dearlier to build a data set on rounds of talks (see footnotes 25 and 26) were
also used to code this variable.
Other Dispute Involvement
This variable is created specifically for the first equation because of the way we
structure the data for estimating this model. As noted earlier, we observe Japa-
nese foreign policy actions against four rival states during each period of
unrest ⁄no-unrest. We therefore create a dummy variable for whether Japan is
engaged in military hostilities against other rival states. For example, if Japan
threatens or uses force against Russia during a given unrest period, this variable
is recorded as a 1 for the remaining rival states, China, the UK, and the United
States. Similarly, we also control for the whether the rival state is involved in
military hostilities against other states.
Rival’s Foreign Policy Behavior
In the initiation equation, two separate variables are used. The first variable
receives a 1 if the rival pursued diplomatic efforts and 0 otherwise. The second
variable receives a 1 if the rival initiated a military threat and 0 otherwise. The
comparison (or omitted) category is no foreign policy action. This variable is
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coded to be time sensitive to our DV. For no-unrest observations, we code the
highest level of the rival’s foreign policy actions taken during the duration of
the observation. For unrest periods and because of possible concerns of endoge-
neity, we code the rival’s foreign policy behavior based on actions taken after the
unrest period begins, but before we code the foreign policy actions taken by
Japan.
In the negotiations equation, the rival’s foreign policy behavior is a dummy
variable with a value of 1 for making concessions and 0 otherwise. We include
two variables in the escalation equation. The first variable measures the number
of troops that rival states deployed or withdrew in the course of the military con-
frontation with Japan (measured in units of 10,000 soldiers). The second variable
receives a 1 if a rival concedes to Japan in the militarized dispute and 0
otherwise.
Lengths of Unrest ⁄No-Unrest Period
This variable applies to only the initiation model and measures the number of
months for each period of domestic unrest or no unrest. While the duration of
unrest periods fluctuates only between 1 and 4 months, no-unrest periods vary
from 1 to 26 months (though 80% are actually 4 months or less).
Japan as an Initiator
This dummy variable is recorded a 1 if Japan is the initiator of a round of talks
for the negotiation model and zero otherwise. In the escalation equation, a value
of 1 is coded if Japan initiated a military conflict and zero otherwise. Coding
Japan as the initiator of talks is taken from our data set on rounds of talks (see
footnote 19), while military threat initiations were coded based on the COW
Data Set on Militarized Interstate Disputes (see Ghosn, Palmer, and Bremer
2004), Brecher and Wilkenfeld (2000), as well as Japanese sources (see footnote
25).
Data Analysis
We employ three statistical models to test our hypotheses. In the first set of tests,
we analyze Japan’s diplomatic and military attempts to change the status quo in
relations with rival states. The three values on the DV described earlier are trea-
ted as categorical but not strictly ordered. As a result, we use multinomial logit
models in which pair-wise comparisons can be made among the three categories
of the DV. In the second set of tests, we examine Japan’s negotiation behavior in
rounds of talks and we use logistic models given the dichotomous coding of out-
comes on the DV. Finally, in the third set of analyses, we test hypotheses on esca-
lation behavior in military confrontations and we use ordinary least squares
(OLS) regression, given the continuous measure of the DV.28
Multinomial Logit Results for Foreign Policy Initiation Models
In Table 4, we present our multinomial results. Two pair-wise comparisons are of
theoretic interest in testing H1a: (i) initiating military threats vs. diplomatic ini-
tiatives to seek negotiations, and (ii) initiating military threats vs. no actions to
challenge the status quo.
28 We also tested for multicollinearity across our three equations but found little evidence of it in any equations
using model-based diagnostics, such as the variance inflation factor, eigenvalues, condition index, and the determi-
nant of the correlation matrix. However, the auxiliary R2 for the interaction term in Equation 3 is .90. This is lar-
gely due to the fact that we use an interaction in a data set with only 68 observations. Nevertheless, our model
diagnostics indicated that multicollinearity was not a serious problem for the full model.
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We see in Table 4 that for both pair-wise comparisons, the interaction terms
are positive and highly significant as expected, but one cannot draw any confi-
dent conclusions about the significance of these interaction terms by simply
looking at these reported results, given the complexities of interpreting interac-
tion terms in nonlinear models (for example, Kam and Franzese 2007). Instead,
we must turn to the first differences to discern the significance of these inter-
action terms which are presented in Table 5.29
In Table 5, we see that the substantive effects of the interaction term are
indeed significant. Specifically, Japan is 400% more likely to threaten force when
it rejects demands conditional on whether the demands are from groups inside
the winning coalition’s base. Similarly, Japan is 185% more likely to initiate hos-
tilities when the demands are from groups within the winning coalition condi-
tional on whether the government rejected such demands. Both of these
findings strongly support our central argument that diversionary incentives are
greatest when government leaders reject domestic opposition demands and
those demands come from groups who are part of the leadership’s winning
coalition.
These supportive findings for H1a hold while controlling for other influences
on decisions to threaten force.30 First, in Table 5, we see that as Japan moves
from a position of military weakness to an advantage, it is about 191% more
likely to threaten force. Second, Japan is nearly 74% less likely to engage in hos-
tilities when it has an alliance with its rival. Third, Japan, contrary to our expecta-
tions, is 71% more likely to threaten or use force when it is engaged in
hostilities against another rival. Finally, there is a percentage change of 49%
in the probability of Japan threatening force when the rival state has offered
concessions.31




vs. maintain status quo
Group inside coalition )1.221 (0.808)* )0.635 (0.767)
Government rejects demands )2.167 (1.044)** )1.415 (1.019)*
Group inside coalition ·
government rejects demands
3.643 (1.282)*** 2.554 (1.234)**
Military balance (ln) 1.229 (0.516)*** 1.209 (0.489)***
Common security ties )1.476 (0.853)** 1.634 (0.829)**
Japan in other MID 0.837 (0.404)** 0.510 (0.361)*
Rival state in other MID )0.404 (0.551) )0.273 (0.502)
Length of unrest ⁄no-unrest
period
)0.0003 (0.0444) 0.101 (0.0411)***
Rival initiated negotiation 1.007 (0.490)** 0.714 (0.427)**
Rival initiated threat )0.224 (0.950) 0.327 (0.854)
Time counter )0.0006 (0.0146) )0.010 (0.0129)
Constant )0.0916 (0.610) )2.104 (0.540)***
(Notes. Observations = 696. *p < .1, **p < .05, ***p < .01 All tests of significance are one-tailed with robust standard
errors.)
29 Following Brambor, Clark, and Golder (2005), we run 10,000 simulations with Clarify (King, Tomz, and
Wittenberg 2000) to compute the first differences and standard errors in order to determine the significance of the
interaction term.
30 Because of space constraints, we only present the first difference and marginal effects (Equation 3) for our
statistically significant control variables.
31 We do not compute the first differences for the length variable even though it is significant in one of the
pair-wise comparisons. We only include this variable because it controls for the way we organized our data set, but
it is not of substantive importance to our analysis.
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Logit Results for Negotiation Outcome Model
The central hypothesis (H1b) is that under conditions of domestic unrest that
create diversionary incentives, Japanese leaders should be less likely to make con-
cessions. The results of the logit analysis are presented in Table 6 with the first
differences reported in Table 7.
As we can see, the logit findings are supportive of our key hypothesis. The esti-
mated coefficient on the interaction term is negative and significant (b = )2.438,
p < .016), which is consistent with our expectation that government leaders are
more likely to demonstrate intransigent behavior in negotiations when they face
a loss of support from domestic groups that form part of their winning coalition.
However, as noted previously, we must calculate the first differences to be confi-
dent about the substantive significance of the interaction term. In Table 7, we
find that Japan is 82% less likely to offer concessions when it rejects demands,
conditional on whether the demands are from groups inside the winning coali-
tion’s base of political support. Similarly, Japan is nearly 65% less likely to offer
concessions when the demands are from the groups within the winning coalition
conditional on whether the government rejects such demands. Both of these
results strongly support our central claim regarding the effects of domestic
unrest on concession-making behavior. When diversionary incentives were













No to yes 2.1 6.0 3.9% (.022) 185.7
Government rejects demand
conditional on group inside
coalition
No to yes 1.2 6.0 4.8% (.025) 400
Military balance (ln) 1:4 to 4:1 2.4 7.0 4.6% 191.7
Common security ties No to yes 3.8 1.0 )2.8% )73.7
Japan in other MID No to yes 3.8 6.5 2.7% 71.1
Rival’s initiated concessions No to yes 3.8 7.9 5.9% 49.2
(Notes. In calculating the predicted probabilities, all other variables are held at their mean or modal values. The sta-
tistical program Clarify (King et al. 2000) was used for calculating predicted probabilities. We report the standard
errors for the first differences for the interaction terms as it is necessary to compute the standard errors associated
with probability changes to determine if the interaction term is significant.)
TABLE 6. Logit Model of Concessions by Japan in Negotiations
Concessions
Group inside coalition )0.327 (0.422)
Government rejects demands 1.103 (0.995)
Group inside coalition · government rejects demands )2.438 (1.137)**
Common security ties 0.442 (0.226)**
Military balance (ln) 0.694 (0.313)**
Talks initiated by Japan )0.403 (0.273)*
Territorial issues at stake )0.606 (0.340)**
Rival’s negotiation behavior 1.326 (0.275)***
Constant )0.0158 (0.346)
(Notes. Observations = 295. *p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01 All tests of significance are one-tailed with robust standard
errors.)
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present, Japanese leaders were far less likely to make concessions and instead
were more likely to adopt a hard-line bargaining position.
Several of the control variables are supported by the logit findings (Table 6).
First, alliance ties produced a percentage change of 43% in Japanese concessions
(Table 7). Second, when the negotiations involved territorial issues, Japan is
almost 33% less likely to offer concessions. Contrary to our expectations, how-
ever, Japan is about 62% more likely to make concessions when it has greater
military capabilities (that is, move the military balance from the 20th to 80th per-
centile). Finally, we see that accommodating behavior by a rival in negotiations
resulted in a percentage change of 81% in concession-making by Japan.
Results for Military Escalation Model
In our data set, there are 68 military conflicts between 1890–1941 in which Japan
directly confronts one of the four rival states, China, Russia, the UK, and the
United States. Unlike the first two analyses, the DV here is continuous as we
measure the change in the number of armed forces deployed from the begin-
ning to the end of a military confrontation. The results of an OLS regression are
presented in Table 8.













No to yes 31.7 11.2 )20.5% (.094) )64.7
Government rejects demand
conditional on group inside
coalition
No to yes 62.7 11.2 )51.5% (.20) )82.1
Military balance (ln) 1:4 to 4:1 34.1 45.1 21.0% 61.8
Common security ties No to yes 38.4 55.1 16.7% 43.5
Territorial issues at stake No to yes 38.4 25.8 )12.6% )32.8
Rival’s initiated concessions No to yes 38.4 69.6 31.2% 81.3
(Notes. In calculating the predicted probabilities, all other variables are held at their mean or modal values. The sta-
tistical program Clarify (King et al. 2000) was used for calculating predicted probabilities. We report the standard
errors for the first differences for the interaction terms as it is necessary to compute the standard errors associated
with probability changes to determine if the interaction term is significant.)
TABLE 8. Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) Estimates of Japanese Troops Deployed or Withdrawn in
Militarized Disputes
Level of escalation
Group inside coalition )2,807.1 (2,473.6)
Government rejects demands )1,002.2 (3,832.6)
Group inside coalition · government rejects demands 15,189.5 (7,663.5)**
Overall military balance 57,010.4 (26,185.7)**
Local military balance )3,098.2 (1,680.3)**
Common security ties )9,143.5 (10,109.5)
Japan initiated conflict 4,100.5 (2,467.5)**
Rival’s concession to Japan )5,617.5 (2,578.9)**
Rival’s number of troops deployed 401.4 (171.1)**
Constant )22,744.2 (10,821.4)**
(Notes. Observations = 68. R2 = 0.4477. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < .01. All tests of significance are one-tailed with
robust standard errors.)
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We find support for our primary hypothesis that when domestic unrest creates
diversionary incentives, Japanese leaders will escalate militarized disputes by
deploying a greater number of troops during the military confrontation (H1c).
In Table 8, the coefficient for the interaction term of the government rejecting
demands from groups within the winning coalition is positive and significant as
expected. This supports our argument that when Japanese leaders faced a loss of
political support from groups within their winning coalition, they were more
motivated to try and rally their support by a stronger show of force and therefore
committed more troops to armed operations.32 Specifically, we find that based
on the marginal effects for the interaction term, Japan deploys almost 15,000
more troops when it rejects the demands of coalition partners, conditional on
the demands being made by groups from within the winning coalition. Likewise,
there is an increase of over 12,000 troops when the demands are from within
the coalition conditional on Japan rejecting the demands.
Several of the control variables in the equation also help explain Japanese
troop level commitments. First, Japan reduces the number of troops by about
3,000 over the course of the military crisis when it has a more favorable local bal-
ance of forces. On the other hand, the stronger Japan is in the overall balance
of forces, the more willing it is to escalate the militarized dispute by deploying
an additional 57,000 troops to the area of direct confrontation. Third, when a
rival state increases its forces by 10,000 soldiers, Japan increases its own troops by
about 4,000. Conversely, Japan withdraws about 5,600 soldiers following a rival’s
state acceptance of Japanese demands. Finally, if Japan is the initiator of the mili-
tarized dispute, it increases the number of troops deployed by more than 4,000.
Case Study
We now turn to a case study of the outbreak of war between Japan and China in
1894. This case nicely illustrates how diversionary incentives influenced all three
of the DVs we have tested: the initiation of military threats by Japan, the with-
holding of concessions by Japan in negotiations, and finally the large-scale escala-
tion of force by Japan. We first discuss the domestic unrest in May and June of
1894 between Prime Minister Ito Hirobumi and his coalition partners, the Jiyuto
and Kokumin Kyokai, and then relate this to Japan’s confrontational policies
toward China that lead to the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in August
1894. Many scholars have, in fact, argued that the Sino-Japanese War is a case of
the diversionary use of force by Japan. For example, Akita (1967:117, 256) argues
that ‘‘one of the most widely held beliefs on the cause of the war is that Ito, dis-
tracted beyond endurance by his difficulties with the Diet, brought about the
war to shift the nation’s attention abroad and away from internal affairs. … (Ito)
had looked to a war with China as a possible solution for the Japanese constitu-
tional difficulty.’’ Likewise, Nish argues that ‘‘[Foreign Minister] Mutsu and
Prime Minister Ito must have been sorely tempted to adopt a course which
would have been popular with the people and the Diet: to send a force to Korea
in order to quench the passions which had been aroused in Japan and to
neutralize political opposition’’ (Nish 1977:36).
Prime Minister Ito Hirobumi and his cabinet came to power in August 1892 on a
platform of expansionist policies. In the following year, an increasing number of
political elites in the government began to advocate for closer relations with popu-
lar parties to strengthen their political coalition (Banno 1992). Consequently,
32 We also need to estimate the marginal effects of the interaction term in this OLS model (Kam and Franzese
2007). The marginal effect of the interaction term, group inside coalition conditional on government rejects
demands (b = 12,382.5, p < .10), and government rejects demands conditional on group inside coalition
(b = 14,187.31, p < .01) are both significant.
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Prime Minister Ito decided to officially ally with the Jiyuto and Kokumin Kyokai.
Most of Ito’s cabinet ministers regarded both of these parties as their political
allies, mainly because the cabinet needed to rely on the Kokumin Kyokai for
support on armament expansion and industrialization, while Jiyuto was supportive
on the key issue of foreign treaty revision (Mutsu 1982). As a result, the winning
collation was expanded to include these two parties.33
For Ito Hirobumi, the Jiyuto, with 32% of the seats in the House of Represen-
tatives, was an attractive ally, because Ito already had close connections with the
party leaders. To join the coalition and gain the status of a major party, the
Jiyuto was forced to compromise with the government over budgetary and
administration issues such as armaments expansion, land taxes, and the develop-
ment of industry (Ito 1991). Nevertheless, the party joined the winning coalition
in the hope of advancing some of its agenda, especially land-tax reduction. Rela-
tions between Jiyuto and Ito started to deteriorate, however, with disagreements
over domestic policy, especially during the sixth Diet session (May 15 1894–June
5 1894) (Banno 1992; Komiya 1995). Specifically, the Jiyuto decided to
denounce the Ito cabinet for failing to achieve budget and administrative reform
relating to land assessment and tax reduction and institutional reform of the
Navy (Ito 1991). The Ito cabinet refused to accept the demands, which provoked
the Jiyuto to condemn the government and to submit new tax cutting and
impeachment bills in May 1894 (Takeuchi 1935; Banno 1992).
At the same time, Prime Minister Ito also found himself in conflict with Koku-
min Kyokai during the sixth Diet. The Kokumin Kyokai was considered a natural
ally because they agreed with the government on a range of policies such as the
development of armed forces, expansion of national power, the promotion of
industry, and a high level of taxation. However, a dispute emerged over the so-
called unequal foreign treaties.34 Although both the government and Kokumin
Kyokai shared an ultimate goal of gaining equal status for Japan by revising the
treaties, they disagreed on the timing and means to do so (Ito 1991). For exam-
ple, the Ito cabinet attempted to initiate separate negotiations with each country,
beginning with Great Britain. The leadership of Kokumin Kyokai, however,
viewed Ito’s negotiation policy as too ‘‘dependent’’ on the Western powers. Con-
sequently, the move to negotiate with the British was challenged by the Kokumin
Kyokai. Moreover, other groups critical of the Ito government’s treaty revision
policy rapidly grew in number and became more institutionally organized and
the Kokumin Kyokai played a vital role in this process (Banno 1992; Komiya
1995). Consequently, the Kokumin Kyokai changed its position from a reliable
ally to a party demanding the government alter its strategy in negotiating the
unequal treaties. Despite the pressure from Kokumin Kyokai, the Prime Minister
rejected its demands in May 1894 and continued to negotiate with the British.
Thus, given the aforementioned political attacks from two members of the win-
ning coalition, Prime Minister Ito’s political standing and credibility had been
severely damaged by the beginning of June 1894. As we argued in our theoretic
framework, therefore, Premier Ito found himself engaged in a period of domes-
tic political unrest that should have generated diversionary incentives. Indeed, as
Foreign Minister Mutsu indicated in his letter to Japanese diplomat Aoki Shuzo,
cabinet downfall was becoming imminent and inevitable unless some sort of
astonishing international event could distract the people’s attention away from
domestic problems (Akita 1967; Mutsu 1982).
On the verge of the cabinet collapsing, heightened international tension
emerged in neighboring Korea as an internal crisis broke out in the spring of
33 See note 14 for the other members of the winning coalition.
34 Since 1858, Japanese relations with foreign powers were governed by these treaties, which deprived Japan of
tariff autonomy and stipulated extraterritoriality for foreigners in Japan (Akita 1967).
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1894. For over two decades, the independence of Korea was an important for-
eign policy dispute between Japan and China, in which Japan challenged Korea’s
subordination to China with the goal of establishing its own dominating sphere
of influence in the Korean peninsula. Specifically, from the end of March 1894,
Korea was engulfed in a civil conflict involving the poorly trained forces of the
government fighting against the followers of a religious movement, calling them-
selves Tonghak (Paine 2003). By the end of May, the violence within Korea had
escalated further between the Tonghak and Korean forces loyal to King Kojong.
Japan was quick to seize on the domestic uprisings as an opportunity to take
forceful actions that would challenge Chinese rights in Korea (Nish 1977).
On June 2, 1894, without an official request from Korea for Japanese assis-
tance, the cabinet decided to send Japanese troops (a mixed brigade of about
7,000 soldiers) and war vessels to secure Japanese interests in Korea (Kajima
1970–1974; Okumura 1995). By June 5, the Ito administration had already estab-
lished its Imperial Headquarters in Hiroshima and dispatched a group of sol-
diers (from the fifth Division of the Army) to Inch’on, the port closest to Seoul.
Thus, consistent with Hypothesis 1a, the Ito cabinet initiated a military confron-
tation with Korea and China in part to offset the political discontent of its coali-
tional partners over domestic policy and to divert criticism away from the
controversy over the unequal treaties. Indeed, as Banno (1992) argued, the polit-
ical instability at home was an important cause of aggressive Japanese policies
against China in Korea.
The benefit of engaging in international conflict, namely a rally-round-the-flag
effect, came immediately as the leadership of both the Kokumin Kyokai and Ji-
yuto parties quickly endorsed the government’s choice of military action in deal-
ing with the Tonghak uprising. Additionally, parliamentary members, army
officers, and newspapers all clamored for and supported strong action against
Korea and China (Banno 1992). For instance, the newspaper, Nihon Shimbun,
which previously had strongly criticized the government over the policy of treaty
revision, began to express openly its support for the government’s confrontation
with China over Korean matters (Inoue et al. 1984–1990). Furthermore, this
rapid change in the opposition’s policy from confronting the government to
strongly supporting it took place despite Ito’s decision on June 2 to dissolve the
Diet against the opposition’s objections.
On June 11, only 9 days after the initial deployment of forces by Japan, Kor-
ean government forces and insurgents concluded an armistice on June 11 end-
ing the domestic turmoil within Korea, but not the crisis between Japan and
China. While China, on the following day, suggested that both Japan and China
withdraw from Korea (Kajima 1970–1974), Japan responded with a hard-line pol-
icy of maintaining its expanded military presence in Korea and seeking to dis-
place China as the dominant external power within Korea. In order to do this,
on June 16 the Ito cabinet proposed to hold negotiations with China on a set of
proposals for implementing political reform in Korea (Gaimusho 1988). Prime
Minister Ito took a hard-line stance in negotiations by making several demands
on China and Korea with the intent of ensuring that diplomacy would fail and
thus forcing a larger military confrontation with China. On June 21, China, as
expected, responded by objecting to what it viewed as a Japanese plan to inter-
fere in Korean internal affairs. In turn, the Ito administration replied to the Chi-
nese representative by indicating that Japan would not withdraw troops from
Korea until its far-reaching reform program had been implemented (Mutsu
1982).
Despite the inability of the two countries to reach agreement in the June nego-
tiations, Japan and China held a second round of talks in Beijing on July 10.
Negotiations were again stalemated as Japan refused to make any concessions.
Upon the breakdown of talks, Prime Minister Ito signed an official note on July
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12, warning China for the second time that Japan would break off its diplomatic
relationship with China unless the Japanese proposal was accepted. By July 17,
after a number of cabinet meetings, Prime Minister Ito and his ministers
approved an ultimatum, which China received on July 19. Within 5 days, China
had to either accept the Japanese proposal on Korean reforms or face the threat
of force by Japan (Mutsu 1982). In sum, given the diversionary incentives moti-
vating the Ito government, the Prime Minister took a hard-line stance in both
rounds of negotiations during June and July with China, which is consistent with
our theory and Hypothesis 1b.
While the Ito administration was engaged in the aforementioned rounds of
talks, it also accelerated its military preparation for war with China. On June 2,
2,000 Japanese troops landed, and then marched into Seoul by June 5; an addi-
tional 5,000 fully equipped troops disembarked on June 15. By the end of June,
10 Japanese warships were patrolling the Korean waters and about 7,000 Japa-
nese troops were stationed on Korean soil, as opposed to 2,100 Chinese forces
stationed there (Fujimura 1973). By mid-July, the Ito cabinet was preparing fur-
ther military actions at the time an ultimatum was issued to China. In particular,
Prime Minister Ito ordered Navy Minister Saigo to take any necessary naval
actions when the ultimatum became due (Takeuchi 1935). The Imperial Head-
quarters in Hiroshima was instructed to propose three principle military strate-
gies that reflected possible scenarios of naval battles with Chinese forces (Kajima
1970–1974; Fujimura 1973). Additionally, within Korea, Japanese forces seized
control of the royal palace in Soeul and formed a puppet government which
then formally requested that Japan expel all Chinese forces (by now more than
15,000) from Korea.
The due date for the ultimatum was set for July 25, and on this very day, hos-
tilities broke out at Asan and P’ung. Japanese and Chinese warships started
exchanging fire near P’ung Island (Battle of P’ung) and Japan sank a Chinese
vessel, killing over 1,000 troops. Shortly thereafter, on August 1, 1894, the Japa-
nese government declared war against China. The war lasted for 9 months, end-
ing with a Japanese military victory, and the two countries signed the peace
treaty at Shimonoseki in Japan on April 17, 1895. The military escalation of the
crisis between China and Japan from early June to the outbreak of the war in
August conforms closely to our theory and Hypothesis 1c. The Ito government,
with strong diversionary incentives, seemed resolved from the outset to use force
to displace Chinese influence and therefore substantially increased its military
presence in Korea, made plans for war, and aggressively confronted Chinese
naval forces just as diplomatic efforts to coerce China into making major conces-
sions had failed.
Conclusion
In this article, we developed and then tested an argument about why diversion-
ary foreign policy actions are only to be expected when leaders reject the policy
demands of groups that are part of the winning coalition. Only when faced with
a loss of political support from such allies are leaders motivated to try and rally
their support through confrontational policies abroad. In contrast, we argue that
when domestic unrest is characterized by leaders either accommodating political
opposition or rejecting the demands of opposition groups that are outside the
winning coalition, leaders have few reasons to engage in diversionary foreign pol-
icy behavior. As a result, we believe that it is critical to distinguish among domes-
tic unrest cases in terms of whether the opposition is within or outside the
winning coalition and whether the government accommodates or rejects opposi-
tion demands, and that such distinctions constitute an important theoretic con-
tribution to the literature on diversionary theory.
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We test our argument in a series of statistical analyses of Japanese foreign pol-
icy behavior from 1890 to 1941. Across all three stages of our analysis, the statisti-
cal findings are consistent and supportive of our argument. As expected, only
domestic political unrest resulting from incumbent leaders’ rejection of coalition
demands caused them to initiate confrontational military policies, to adopt more
hard-line negotiating policies, and to escalate ongoing military conflicts.
There are several directions to consider in future research that build upon the
results of this study. Theoretically, the analysis could be extended by developing
models to explain when governments are likely to accommodate or reject the
demands of political opposition groups. If such models are developed, this
would help to further elucidate the domestic and international conditions that
create incentives for diversionary foreign policy by driving the theoretic analysis
back one step further in the causal chain. Another important theoretic issue to
consider is our claim that diversionary theory is best understood as a theory of
the timing of confrontational foreign policy behavior as opposed to a direct and
central cause of international conflict. We do not attempt in this study to directly
address this question but instead we adopt a research design strategy that situates
the analysis of diversionary behavior in the context of ongoing disputes and rela-
tions with major rival states. In the absence of existing disputes and unsettled
issues in foreign relations with other countries, we do not think that conditions
of domestic unrest are likely to cause leaders to pursue highly conflictual policies
internationally. Put differently, we see diversionary theory as a proximate causal
explanation of conflict behavior as opposed to a theory that identifies underlying
causes of international crises and war. We think this is an important question to
grapple with in future research.
Empirically, the generalizability of our argument needs to be tested much
more systematically by extending large-n analyses across different temporal and
spatial domains. At the same time, our theoretic approach does place limits on
the use of large cross-national time series data sets to test our arguments. The
primary reason is that quite detailed information is needed in cases of domestic
unrest, in order to determine whether diversionary incentives are present for
incumbent leaders. As result, it is likely that further statistical testing of the the-
ory will center on single countries such as we have done, or larger efforts in
which a small number of countries are pooled together for comparative analyses.
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